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warships off the coast of the U.S., intercontinental ballistic missiles, and regional adversaries blocking U.S. access to vital resources are all threats to the U.S. vital interests that the public understands and not only expects, but demands, the DOD and IC to provide proper predictive warning against.
The additional threat the U.S. must prepare for today makes that statement no longer true.
Today, the United States must also protect herself from the threat of critical infrastructure electronic attacks conducted by adversaries who are able to move virtually within and across the borders of the United States, complicating and clouding the responsibilities and legal roles of the DOD and IC. To properly warn of this type of threat means the DOD and IC would have to conduct traditional information gathering and analysis in ways that the public would not only vehemently oppose, but which would also be illegal.
By giving the Justice Department the responsibility to provide cyber-attack threat warning information, the Clinton Administration placed an important part of cyber-defense within an agency without the culture, background, ability, or public support to accomplish it. As evidence, the NIPC has yet to issue any cyber threat warning information in the two years of their existence.
Worse, the NIPC has been largely criticized for their lack of coordination with private industry and sharing of post-attack profiles and information with other government agencies or private businesses. The culture of the NIPC, which their actions to date confirm, is to use the information they gain concerning unauthorized cyber or electronic intrusions for the primary purpose of building a criminal case for prosecution within the courts. While this is an important and needed part of the overall defense of critical infrastructures, it runs counter to sharing information for the purpose of predicting and warning others of impending attacks. Like the DOD and IC, the Justice Department would also be seen as violating civil rights should they ever take the steps necessary to provide encompassing threat warning information.
Vulnerabilities and Threats
To understand why an I&W system for cyber-attacks is important, it is necessary to first understand the vulnerabilities of and threat to the critical infrastructure. There are many that argue all this talk about threats and vulnerabilities is nothing more than government and specific business industries creating an unfounded panic in order to garner money or tighten government controls on the public's freedoms. While the opponents need to be heard, I contend that the government's warning should be taken 
Indications and Warning
If the critical infrastructures of the U.S. are subject to a threat of attack and need protecting, then a system is required that would identify the indicators and provide the warning that an attack is likely. Although directed as a task for the NIPC within PDD-63, that warning system does not completely exist today. Warning must also be conducted within a specific timeframe in order to be useful. The timing of the warning will differ depending on when indicators become known. For the purposes of this paper, I will term tactical warning that warning provided when an attack is just beginning or ongoing, and strategic warning that warning provided sufficiently in advance of an attack so that defensive, preventative, or preemptive measures can be employed. It is only fair to point out that the same industry ISACs that are poor at tactical warning do a reasonable job at post-event analysis, reporting, and coordination within and among industry and government. But conducting this type of post-analysis is akin to closing the barn door after the cows have escaped. If the infrastructure sectors are poor at tactical warning, then certainly they make up for it through strategic warning? Unfortunately, as hard as tactical warning is, strategic warning poses even more challenges and the ISACs haven't even begun to consider them.
Strategic warning is more complicated than tactical warning because strategic warning must determine adversary intent and make reasonable predictions on the likelihood of the adversary carrying out his intent. Assessments must be made concerning whether adversaries exist, if they possess the means to attack, whether they possess the skills and will to attack, the method of attack, and timeframe the attack will take place.
The DOD and IC has, again, historically been reasonably successful with this type of I&W against conventional threats and has, over time, created a comprehensive I&W infrastructure that supports impressive modeling and analysis so that predictive warning is credible. The DOD and IC also have an important strategic cyber warning role. The problem is that the DOD and IC cannot provide warning against all threats. Since anyone with a computer and INTERNET access is a potential threat, I am choosing to ignore those attackers who are unknown until they actually conduct an attack, even though that is a very serious I&W problem all its own. But even when choosing to not factor the risk of unknown actors as a threat, the DOD and IC are still unable to provide strategic warning against the remaining potential threats.
Consider the group of potential attackers mentioned earlier: cyber-terrorists, criminals, nation states, "professional" hackers, and teenaged joy-riders. A proper I&W system needs to provide strategic warning against all these actors since they all pose some level of threat; the tools used and vulnerabilities exploited by one actor are the same for all. While the DOD and IC have a clear role in providing strategic warning against any of these actors residing outside U.S. borders, they cannot conduct the intelligence and analysis activities necessary to provide warning against actors within U.S. borders; even when (like one recent real-world example) a foreign national convinced unwitting U.S. citizens to aid him in an attack.
Again the question becomes, who is providing strategic threat warning for private industry and the infrastructure sectors? Certainly NIPC has a role, but it is limited to conducting criminal investigations for law enforcement purposes. The ISACs, on the other hand, should be interested in strategic warning, but have not begun to even consider all the steps necessary to conduct predictive threat warning. They are overwhelmed in just conducting post-attack and vulnerability analysis and reporting. Interestingly, however, there are private businesses emerging in a new market who are offering to provide this type of service to private business customers.
One such business is iDefense, a company that conducts hardware and software analysis for customers to provide them with vulnerability assessments in order to repair or minimize them. 
Proposals and Conclusion
So what needs to be done to improve strategic cyber threat warning? The answer appears simple, but is actually difficult. Mr. Gravell summed it up into this statement, "the government needs to determine and publish its vital national information interests."'1 5 Easily said, hard to do in a reasonable manner that identifies the exact information infrastructures and systems that need to be defended and protected like all other vital U.S. interests.
Take the example of the cyber attack actors again. As currently written, all cyber attacks are federal crimes. This means that the unwitting teenaged joy-rider can be held to the same level of criminal liability as a cyber-terrorist intent on damaging a power distribution system. But both of these actions do not involve the same level of threat to the vital interests of the U.S. Developing a better definition and understanding of vital national information interests has several benefits:
It identifies and gets buy-in from the government and industry as to what the vital interests truly are.
It focuses the DOD and IC on providing an assessment of whether our vital interests can actually be threatened through cyber means, and if so, provides a priority for countering the threat.
With industry buy-in, they become more willing to share cyber and proprietary information with the government concerning vital interests.
It prioritizes for the government what is and is not important when requesting industry cooperation and information sharing.
It prioritizes cyber law enforcement efforts.
It permits laws to be changed which would reduce the criminal liability of inconsequential cyber attacks while simultaneously permitting the development of response tools and methods when vital interests are challenged.
In conclusion, Indications and Warning of cyber threats, as for all threats, are vital to understanding and preventing attacks against the critical infrastructure of the United States. Cyber I&W efforts, unfortunately, are lacking and there are no foreseen measures being undertaken to improve them. The one organization tasked with cyber threat warning, NIPC, is not culturally or organizationally positioned to provide cyber I&W, and more importantly, share that information with a wide audience in a way that would be useful. The DOD and IC, who are more adept at I&W are prohibited from conducting certain activities against U.S. citizens within the borders of the U.S. A true, complete, comprehensive I&W framework will actually have to rely on all have buy-in, it is important that the government not make all cyber attacks equal or categorize all information requirements as vital. Instead, the true vital information interests of the U.S. need to be identified and published to coalesce unity of effort towards assessing and ameliorating those cyber threats to the vital interests. In doing so, strategic threat warning becomes more focused and limited resources can be placed against those infrastructures where tactical threat warning would continue to be needed. The benefit of which will be a more responsive government-industry partnership able to predict, identify, and warn of the increased likelihood of cyber attack for prevention and mitigation purposes, as envisioned in PDD-63.
